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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Bret D. Hollingsworth appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated battery in

case no. 46156/CR-FE-2016-1499, asserting the district court erroneously accepted his guilty
plea and erroneously denied his motion t0 withdraw his plea.

In case n0.

46836/CV01-17-19830, consolidated 0n appeal, Hollingsworth appeals from

the district court’s order and judgment dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement

Of The

The

Facts

state’s offer

And Course Of The Proceedings
0f proof in case no. 46156/CR-FE-2016-1499 was as follows:

...[L]aw enforcement responded 0n February 3rd, 2016, t0 an address 0n Grover
Street in

Ada County,

inside the residence.

Darner. She

Law

Idaho.

When

they arrived, they heard yelling and scufﬂing

turns out that that residence belongs t0

It

was not present. She had run

t0 call

911

at the

Ms. Darla

house next door.

They found Mr. Ronald Smith on top of Mr.
Hollingsworth. Mr. Ronald Smith was bleeding profusely from a [sic] stab and
slash wounds about his body; his chest, his back, his arm.
enforcement entered.

Mr. Hollingsworth was underneath Mr. Smith

was
91

yelling, he’s in here, he’s in here.

who was

According

securing him.

to Darla, she

made

Mr. Smith
a run to call

1.

And

then later Mr. Smith, after he was stabilized because 0f the severity of the

injuries at the hospital, they related t0

been in Darla’s living room, heard something in
the door. The dog was acting funny.
Mr. Hollingsworth burst

in.

two 0f them had
the garage. Darla went t0 open

law enforcement

Darla went t0 the

side.

that the

Mr. Smith got in front 0f her,

between her and Mr. Hollingsworth, who had a knife in his hand. And Mr. Smith
described it as kind of being punched at ﬁrst and then he realized he was being
stabbed. He reached out and has a large laceration 0n his hand from where the

him

there.

altercation

went

knife struck

The

t0

the

ground.

Mr. Smith was able

Hollingsworth until law enforcement arrived.

Law

t0

secure Mr.

enforcement recovered the

knife based 0n Mr. Smith’s description 0f Where he had put

Mr. Hollingsworth and both
(8/10/16 Tr., p.18, L.6

The
0n Smith.

state

(R.,

— p.19,

men were treated for injuries

it

after taking

it

from

related t0 this incident.

L.20.)

ﬁled a complaint that alleged Hollingsworth committed an aggravated battery
pp.12-131.)

The

state

later

charged Hollingsworth by information with

aggravated battery, and alleged an additional count 0f use of a deadly weapon in a commission 0f
a crime.

(R., pp.39-40.)

his preliminary hearing.

Hollingsworth, represented by private counsel Tiffany Hales, waived
(R., p.38.)

Eight days

later,

Hollingsworth entered a plea of not

guilty.

(R., p.42.)

The

parties eventually entered into a settlement agreement.

(R., p.68.)

In exchange for

Hollingsworth’s guilty plea to aggravated battery, the state agreed t0 dismiss the deadly weapon

enhancement, and agreed to “recommend a uniﬁed prison sentence 0f 15 years With seven ﬁxed

and eight indeterminate,” with Hollingsworth “free
24.)

t0 argue for less.”

Hollingsworth executed a guilty plea advisory form

colloquy with the
“I believe

I

district court, entered a guilty

stabbed Mr. Smith, Your Honor, and

(8/10/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-

(R., pp.69-76), and, after a lengthy

plea t0 aggravated battery because, as he put

it

was an unlawful

it:

act” (8/10/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.2-

3).

Hollingsworth was sentenced in October 0f 2016.

(R.,

p.78.)

The

district

court

concluded that Hollingsworth was “not ready t0 be in society,” and that the “danger [he]
demonstrated through
sentencing.

1

this Violent attack”

(10/15/16

TL,

p.56,

was “not

Ls.9-13.)

in

The

any way mitigated by
district

court

[his] attitude” at

accordingly

Citations herein t0 “R.” refer t0 the clerk’s record in the direct appeal

sentenced

(46156/CR-FE-2016-

1499) and citations t0 “PCR.” refer t0 the clerk’s record in the post-conviction appeal

(46836/CV01-17-19830).

Hollingsworth to 15 years, With seven years ﬁxed, and imposed the sentence.
appeal was ﬁled from this judgment 0f conviction.

(R., p.81.)

No

(E R.)

In October 0f 2017, Hollingsworth ﬁled a petition for post-conviction relief in case n0.

46836/CV01-17-19830. (PCR., pp.10-16.) Hollingsworth, represented by new private counsel,
alleged that the

“improperly accepted by the
additionally claimed that

prejudice,”

“was not knowingly, voluntarily or

guilty plea

trial

trial

court,” for a variety of reasons.

counsel’s “performance

0n several grounds. (PCR., pp.12-15.)

that “[t]rial counsel failed t0 ﬁle a notice

[her] t0

d0

intelligently

(PCR., p.1

was deﬁcient and

Among

1.)

made” and

Hollingsworth

ineffective

and caused

other things, Hollingsworth alleged

of appeal even though” Hollingsworth “had instructed

so.” (PCR., p.15.)

Hollingsworth’s petition was supported by his
not competent “to waive

physical impairments,

’7

my

and

rights”

that

themselves and by” his counsel.
that trial counsel

was

consulting 0r advising

declaration,

and enter a plea “due

which alleged

t0 signiﬁcant, existing

that

he was

mental and

he was “intimidated into entering a plea by the proceedings
(PCR., pp.17-18.) Along similar

ineffective

me

own

by “Waiv[ing]

my

lines,

Hollingsworth alleged

right t0 a preliminary hearing Without

about this waiver.” (PCR., p.18.) Hollingsworth also alleged that

trial

counsel was ineffective in various other ways, including that she “never explained the elements

0f self—defense,” never sought a competency evaluation, “was intimidated by the State’s
attorney,”

and “refused

t0 fully

and effectively investigate the

facts alleged

and the

Viability”

of a

“self—defense” claim. (PCR., pp.18-20.)

Hollingsworth additionally submitted the declaration of
discussed concerns about

trial

Mandy

Dillard, his niece,

who

counsel, based 0n things that counsel purportedly told her. (PCR.,

pp.35-37.) Dillard discussed Hollingsworth’s purported “waning mental state,” and opined

“[i]t

was apparent

that [Hollingsworth]

result” of the incident.

had been seriously

injured, including a

(PCR., p.37.) Dillard also accused

trial

head

injury, as a

counsel of “not prepar[ing] any

defense by investigating critical” Witness statements, and by not “effectively communicat[ing]”

with Hollingsworth. (PCR., pp.38-39.)
Finally, Hollingsworth’s petition

local criminal defense attorney.

When

“particularly

the defendant

was supported by

Patterson purported that in felony cases,

(PCR., pp.41-43.)

is

exposed

the declaration 0f George Patterson, a

to signiﬁcant incarceration,

it is

imperative that the

defendant assert his or her right to a preliminary hearing unless a plea agreement, acceptable t0
the defendant, has been reached prior t0 the preliminary hearing.”

also stated that “[t]he preliminary hearing

strategy in criminal cases,”

is

the

and opined “[t]here

is

most important
no

(PCR., pp.41-42.) Patterson
tool for developing a defense

strategic or tactical

advantage to waiving a

preliminary hearing” Without a plea agreement; “[t]o the contrary, a waiver of the preliminary
hearing, Without any beneﬁt to the defendant, places the defense at a serious disadvantage.”

(PCR., p.42.)

The
dismiss

all

state

ﬁled an answer to the petition (PCR., pp.45-46), and

of the claims in the petition, save one: “the

of counsel for failing to [ﬁle] an appeal”
that trial counsel

(R., p.47).

last

L.4

—

p.8, L.1.)

[Hollingsworth]

representation, to

know
Which

summarily

trial

to this claim, the state agreed

counsel purported that Hollingsworth

“asked for an appeal,” but she told him she would not ﬁle one unless he “[paid] his

Tr., p.6,

to

claim relating to ineffective assistance

With respect

gave ineffective assistance, insofar as

moved

Moreover, the post-conviction prosecutor asked

trial

bill.” (3/8/18

counsel if she “let

that

he can ask the State Appellate Public Defender’s Ofﬁce” for

trial

counsel “said n0.” (3/8/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.9-1

1.)

The

state

accordingly

“move[d] the court

to grant relief

on the

last

claim” so that Hollingsworth could “ﬁle an appeal.”

(R., p.47; 3/8/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.13-15.)

Hollingsworth subsequently ﬁled a supplemental declaration, in which he claimed,

among

when he pleaded

other things, that

applied only in one’s

own home,” and

guilty he thought “that the defense 0f self—defense

that

had he “been properly advised with respect

t0 the

element of intent,” he “would not have plead[ed] guilty.” (PCR., p.73.)

Following a hearing on the
order granting the state’s

state’s dismissal

summary

motion, the post-conviction court entered an

dismissal motion in part and denying

it

in part.

pp.110-23.)

Regarding the claims that Hollingsworth’s plea was not knowing,

voluntary, 0r

was otherwise “improperly accepted by

“inquiry during [Hollingsworth’s] plea hearing

Idaho Criminal Rule 11.”

(PCR., pp.1 12-14.)

(PCR.,

intelligent, or

the Court,” the court concluded that the

was proper pursuant
“With respect

t0 all

of the requirements of

t0 the issue

of self—defense,” the

court found, “Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c) does not contain any requirement that the Court inform

a defendant of any or

all

potential defenses.”

“drew [Hollingsworth’s] attention

(PCR., p.1 15.) Nevertheless, the sentencing court

t0 the possible availability”

0f a self—defense argument, and

Hollingsworth indicated he understood he would “be giving up that potential defense” by
pleading guilty.”

competency
inquired

(Id. (citing

8/10/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-22).)

to enter a plea, the court

about

[Hollingsworth]

[Hollingsworth’s]

answered

all

Finally, regarding Hollingsworth’s

concluded that “[t]he record shows that the Court clearly

understanding

0f the proceedings

of the Court’s questions clearly and

[Hollingsworth] indicated to the Court that he understood everything that

both orally and in writing.” (PCR., p.1 16.)

multiple

times,

that

and

that

articulately,

was being asked 0f him

Turning to ineffective assistance 0f counsel, post-conviction court concluded that
Hollingsworth failed t0 meet his burden to show that
purported

inexperience

or

trial

or

phobias;

due

to

trial

counsel was ineffective due to

purported

failures

investigate

to

Hollingsworth’s competency; advise Hollingsworth 0n the elements 0f the crime 0r a

self-

defense claim; investigate the crime 0r ligate pre-trial motions; review discovery; and/or advise

and

assist

Hollingsworth “throughout the entry of plea process.” (PCR., pp.1 16-21.)

The post-conviction court denied
Hollingsworth’s claim that

preliminary hearing.

trial

(PRC,

the

state’s

motion,

however,

With

respect

t0

counsel was ineffective for advising Hollingsworth to waive the
pp.118-19.)

“[G]iven that the State submitted an

Complaint during the preliminary hearing adding an enhancement

t0 the

Amended

charged crimes and

it

does not appear that any plea deal had been discussed 0r agreed upon,” the court found that

“under an obj ective review 0f the record and the uncontroverted evidence, there does not appear
t0

be any strategic or

tactical

reason for waving the preliminary hearing.” (PCR., p.1 19.)

The

court concluded that “there appears t0 be a potential shortcoming capable 0f objective review in

this

matter that requires an evidentiary hearing.”

(Id.)

The post-conviction court accordingly granted

the state’s motion in part, dismissing the

plea-entry claim and the bulk of the ineffective assistance claims.

(PCR., p.122.)

denied the state’s motion With respect to Hollingsworth’s “claim that his
ineffective for waiving” his “preliminary hearing.”

“agree[d] with” Hollingsworth that

trial

(Id.)

trial

it

counsel was

Finally, noting that the state already

counsel’s failure to ﬁle an appeal

assistance, the post-conviction court indicated

The court

was

ineffective

would “reﬁle [Hollingsworth’s] Judgement of

Conviction in [the underlying criminal case] so that” Hollingsworth could ﬁle an appeal. (PCR.,
pp.121-22.)

Shortly thereafter, in June 2018, the district court reﬁled Hollingsworth’s criminal-case

judgment.

(R.,

pp.133-36.)

Hollingsworth ﬁled a “Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and

Reconsider[] Sentence.” (R., pp.137-39.) In

it,

Hollingsworth

moved

for leave to

Withdraw

his

plea “pursuant t0 I.C.R. 33(0) in order t0 correct manifest injustice.” (R., p.137.) Hollingsworth

also

moved

the court “to reconsider the sentence

t0 I.C.R. 35(a) 0r, in the alternative,

it

rather,

it

stated that

it

was “supported by ﬁle herein together with

notice 0f. (Id.) Hollingsworth stated that he

memorandum

extensive arguments and

The

district court

Withdraw the

(R., p.138.)

would “not repeat

moved

all

the pleadings

the court to take judicial

the proof and arguments set forth

was assigned

Likewise, Hollingsworth concluded that “oral argument

is

to those proceedings

Will not be submitted” because the

motion was “based 0n the

in the post-conviction proceeding.” (Id.)

denied Hollingsworth’s motion in

its entirety.

Regarding the request t0

plea, the court noted that Hollingsworth “has not presented the

argument or authority to support his motion.”

(R.,

p.149.)

The court

Court with any

“Instead,” the court noted,

Hollingsworth “requests that the Court take judicial notice 0f the entirety 0f

(Id.)

pursuant

is

Court

memoranda submitted

Post-Conviction proceedings.”

illegal

and

in the post-conviction proceeding as this

not required and a

it is

motion had no supporting brieﬁng or argument of its

submitted” in the post-conviction case, Which Hollingsworth

familiar With the case.”

(1)

should be reduced as a matter 0f leniency pursuant t0

I.C.R. 35(b).” (R., p.137.) Hollingsworth’s

own;

imposed herein because

[his ﬁlings] in his

“deline[d] to d0 so”:

Defendant’s ﬁlings in [the post-conviction case] do not present any argument,
authority, or analysis of “manifest injustice” as required for the Court t0 ﬁnd
pursuant t0 Idaho Criminal Rule 33(0); and, Defendant has not presented any such
argument, authority, or analysis in this motion. Thus, Defendant’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea pursuant
ad.)

t0

Rule 33(c)

is

denied.

Turning to Hollingsworth’s request for relief under Rule 35(a), the court denied the

motion

to correct

an

illegal

authority, or analysis for the

(7) years

sentence because Hollingsworth had “not presented any argument,

Court t0 consider as to

how

ﬁxed, followed by (8) years indeterminate

0r

Why

Defendant’s sentence of seven

is illegal.”

(R., pp.149-50.)

The court

likewise denied relief under Rule 35(b), because Hollingsworth had “not presented any argument,

authority, or analysis for the

Court t0 consider as to

“ﬁnd

such, the court could not

excessive.”

(Id.)

that

or

Why”

his “sentence

any new evidence

or excessive,” nor had Hollingsworth “presented

As

how

[Hollingsworth’s]

was unduly harsh

t0 consider.”

(R., p.150.)

was unduly harsh or

sentence

Hollingsworth’s motion—requesting relief under Rules 33(0), 35(a), and

35(b)—Was accordingly denied.

(R.,

p.15 1.) Hollingsworth timely appealed. (R., pp.140-43.)

Meanwhile, in the post—conviction case, Hollingsworth moved the court to reconsider
prior order partially granting the state’s

The

0n the other hand, ﬁled a second motion

state,

support.

motion for summary

(E

PCR.,

p.6.)

The

district court

for

(PCR., pp.6, 161-68.)

disposition.

summary

its

disposition and a brief in

entered an order denying both motions (PCR.,

pp.174-78), Which reiterated that “[a]t this stage in the proceedings the statement 0f claims

within the petition, combined with the afﬁrmations in [Hollingsworth’s] ﬁled declarations, are
sufﬁcient to withstand a motion for

summary dismissal and proceed to an

evidentiary hearing” on

the remaining claim of ineffective assistance 0f counsel regarding the preliminary hearing waiver

(PCR., p.177).

Hollingsworth
counsel,

moved

for permission t0

Which the post-conviction court granted.

At

trial

(E PCR., pp.7, 84-85).

the ensuing deposition Hales explained

preliminary hearing:

conduct discovery, seeking to depose

Why

she advised Hollingsworth to waive the

A.

I

believe that at

my

[Hollingsworth] and

that’s—again,

I

I

my

meeting 0n the 2nd—after

had decided

to

meeting 0n the 2nd, that

waive the preliminary hearing.

don’t have speciﬁc notes here that indicate that, but at

I

believe

some point

between the 2nd and When the preliminary hearing happened 0n the 15th
we had reached a conclusion that it would be best t0 waive the preliminary
in time

hearing.

Q.

And why was

A.

Again,

it

best?

we went

through the pluses and the minuses of going through the

I laid it out for [Hollingsworth].
And my opinion was
we would be better off t0 waive the preliminary hearing because there really
wasn’t much value that we would get out of the preliminary hearing. And the risk

preliminary hearing, and
that

0f making the prosecutor even—the Victim,

should say, even more upset in this
case and putting more pressure 0n the prosecutor ..., in my opinion, outweighed

any beneﬁt
Q.

we

could get

What would be

A.

And

at the

if

preliminary hearing.

the pressure

Well, you’ve got a Victim

0n the prosecutor?

who

nearly died.

He was

he had to go to the preliminary hearing and

could have been traumatic for him.

maximum
30 years. And the

there’s a

(Dep. Tn, p.1 18,

He may have

of 30 years in jail for
prosecutor

likely to give credence t0

is

this guy.

quite upset about that.

testify

and

said, hey, I
I

want him

relive that, that

want

this

guy—

t0 sit in jail for all

dealing with a very upset Victim, and they are

an upset Victim.

L8 — p.1 19, L16?)

In other words, Hales

was

I

afﬁrmed

that

to render the Victims less hostile,

“one 0f the values of waiving the preliminary hearing
less upset,”

prosecutor to seek “an even longer sentence”—Hales

Which would put

felt “that

any value

less pressure

we would

0n the

get out 0f the

preliminary hearing would be outweighed by the chance that he could be looking at a
longer term injail.” (Dep. Tr., p.1 19, L.22

— p.120,

L.9.)

Hales also afﬁrmed that she explained t0 Hollingsworth that
judge’s only job

2

The deposition

is t0

much

at

a preliminary hearing “the

decide if there’s probable cause,” that this was a lower threshold than

transcript is

found 0n pages 182 through 247 of the post-conviction record.

Citations herein will refer to the transcript’s internal pagination.

9

reasonable doubt, and that “there was really n0 doubt he was going t0 get bound over for

trial.”

(Dep. Tr., p.155, Ls.2-24.) She also afﬁrmed that “the recommendation t0 Mr. Hollingsworth to

waive the preliminary hearing” was “a speciﬁc
her “training and

preparation and

strategic decision” she

made,

that

was based upon

understanding 0f criminal law and the elements 0f

aggravated battery and the defense 0f self—defense.” (Dep.

Tr.,

p.159, L.4

— p.160,

L.9.)

Hales additionally testiﬁed about her rationale for not using a preliminary hearing t0
explore “credibility issues” “involving [Darla] Darner and [the Victim] Smith”:

Well,

I

didn’t think there

credibility issues,

[were]

Credibility issues, as far as Darla goes, again,

0f things.
case.

of

First

Plus, if I

all,

her credibility,

wanted

to attack her

I

it is

thought,

and

I

as

far

was somewhat

Smith goes.

as

not only—I mean,

it is

a couple

peripheral in this

attacked her at the preliminary hearing

and we decided t0 go t0 trial, that’s now not a strategy I can use at trial. She’s
going t0 be expecting that at trial and maybe even had time t0 come up With ways
to

enhance her

stories

even more.

(Dep. Tr., p.166, L.14 — p.167, L.8.)

Following the deposition, the parties ﬁled, among other things, competing motions for

summary disposition 0n
that

the ﬁnal claim left in the petition. (PCR., pp.398-444.)

The

state

argued

Hales did not give deﬁcient performance by advising Hollingsworth t0 waive the preliminary

hearing, and that “[e]ven if the [court] found counsel t0 be deﬁcient, [Hollingsworth] has failed

to

show he was

[prejudiced].”

“was n0 objectively reasonable

(PCR., p.416.)

Hollingsworth argued to the contrary that there

strateg[y] or tactic

waive the preliminary hearing,” and

employed by Hales

in her

that “but for Hales’ ineffectiveness”

recommendation

t0

he “would not have

plead[ed] guilty.” (PCR., p.444.)

At

the hearing

0n the motions

for

summary judgment,

oral ruling granting the state’s motion:

10

the post-conviction court issued an

I

think that the State’s correct that the tactical decisions as represented

by Ms.

Hales in her—at least in the portions of the transcript With her deposition that I’ve

been presented with go directly to tactics and strategy. And it is a reasonable
explanation in my View that she would counsel a client not t0 further antagonize
the State,

Which had an

offer

waived, in order to maintain

And

also, frankly,

been another
still

0n the

table at the time the preliminary hearing

was

that.

Ithink that

I

can infer from her comments that there might have

strategic reason not to

have put Ms. Darner on the stand even

intended to attack her credibility

later,

Which she could have

if

she

at the trial if

she

had gone

t0 trial.

And one

0f those reasons might have been not t0 telegraph t0 that witness What

kind of questions that she could then prepare for her

So—I think that her actions

at the

time she got t0

trial.

ﬁnd that
those are incompetent. I can’t ﬁnd any basis t0 support the petition for summary
judgment by Mr. Hollingsworth. I can ﬁnd that basis in the motion ﬁled for—
ﬁled by the

have

[sic] fairly

grounded in

strategy.

I

can’t

State.

So I’m going

to grant the State’s

(2/21/19 T11, p.10, L.9

—

p.1

1,

L.1

1.)

motion for summary judgment

The post-conviction court subsequently issued a judgment

granting Hollingsworth relief on the claim that his

failing to ﬁle a direct appeal, but

at this point.

trial

counsel gave ineffective assistance by

denying relief 0n the every other claim in the petition. (PCR.,

pp.473, 478.) Hollingsworth timely appealed. (PCR., pp.474-77.)
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ISSUES
Hollingsworth states the issues 0n appeal

(1)

Did the

District Court abuse

as:

discretion

its

by accepting Appellant’s

guilty

plea?

(2)

Did

the

District

Court

abuse

discretion

its

by

failing

t0

consider

Appellant’s post—conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

(3)

Did

the District Court err in granting Respondent’s initial motion for

summary judgment
(4)

Did

the

(First

Court

District

reconsideration (Second

(5)

Did

DECISION)?
err

denying

in

Appellant’s

motion

for

DECISION)?

the District Court err in denying Appellant’s subsequent motion for

summary judgment regarding
hearing (Third DECISION)?

trial

counsel’s waiver of the preliminary

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Hollingsworth
knowing,

II.

III.

intelligent,

Has Hollingsworth

the district court abused

its

discretion

by accepting

his

and voluntary guilty plea?

show the district court erred When it denied his motion
was unsupported; alternatively, has Hollingsworth failed

failed to

Withdraw

his plea because

show any

error

it

t0
t0

on the merits?

Has Hollingsworth
ﬁrst

show

failed to

failed t0

show

the post-conviction court erred

by granting

the state’s

motion for summary disposition and dismissing the majority of the claims

in the

petition?

Has Hollingsworth

failed

t0

show

the post—conviction court erred

reconsideration motion that relied 0n a cumulative-error theory,

more than one

by denying his
but that failed to show

error?

Has Hollingsworth

failed to

show

the post-conviction court erred

by concluding

that trial

counsel did not give ineffective assistance 0f counsel by advising Hollingsworth t0 waive
his preliminary hearing?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Hollingsworth’s Plea

District

A.

And Voluntary, And He
Court Erred BV Accepting It

Was Knowing,

Intelligent,

Fails

To Show The

Introduction

Hollingsworth claims

this case is

about a “breakdown of the criminal process,” in which

the district court erred

by “accepting a tendered

support a guilty plea.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

guilty plea

He

under circumstances Which did not

argues that his “plea 0f guilt[y] was not

voluntary because he was not advised of the elements of self—defense by either the District Court
0r

trial

counsel.”

discretion

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

by not advising him “of

And

the elements 0f self—defense” and

acknowledged by [Hollingsworth],

factual basis,

he goes 0n t0 argue that the court abused

by not

that supported the plea.”

its

“establish[ing] a

(Appellant’s brief,

p.193.)

Incorrect.

intelligent,

after a

and voluntary.

it

was an unlawful

And even though

afﬁrmative defenses,

on the record,

3

It is

erred

Hollingsworth repeatedly expressed his desire t0 plead

thorough and exacting colloquy, bluntly stated that “I believe

Honor, and
plea.

A review of the record shows that Hollingsworth’s plea was plainly knowing,

that

it

act.”

the court

(8/10/16 TL, p.18, Ls.2-3.)

was not required

to

stabbed Mr. Smith, Your

The court properly accepted

his

expressly did so. (8/10/16 T11, p.17, Ls.16-22.) Hollingsworth afﬁrmed,

he Wished to waive his potential self—defense claim.

rejecting his

and

inform Hollingsworth 0f any potential

unclear Whether Hollingsworth’s ﬁrst issue 0n appeal

by

I

guilty,

motion

to

withdraw his

is

(E

id.)

The

direct

a claim that the criminal-case court

plea, or that the post-conviction court erred

(E

by

Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
denying his post-conviction claim regarding the plea, 0r both.
Hollingsworth’s proper plea largely disposes 0f the merits of both 0f those issues, Which is why
this brief discusses this the propriety

0f the plea as a threshold
13

issue.

appeal record shows the guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the district court
properly accepted

B.

Standard

it.

Of Review

Idaho’s appellate courts “conduct an independent review of the record”

When an

appellant

challenges the “voluntariness of a guilty plea 0n appeal.” State V. Spgy, 127 Idaho 107, 110, 897

P.2d 1002, 1005

(Ct.

App. 1995)

(State V. Ayala, 118 Idaho 94, 95,

App. 1990)). This Court Will therefore “consider the

totality

794 P.2d 1150, 1151

(Ct.

of the circumstances in determining

the voluntariness of a plea.” Li.

C.

Hollingsworth Fails To

Show His

Plea

Was Not Knowing,

Intelligent,

Or Voluntary, Or

That The District Court Otherwise Erred In Accepting His Plea

T0 pass
voluntarily.

constitutional muster a plea

State V.

must be “entered knowingly,

intelligently

and

Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991). “Whether a plea

is

voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) Whether the defendant’s plea was
voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature 0f the charges and was not coerced; (2)

whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights
accusers, and t0 refrain

from incriminating himself; and

consequences 0f pleading guilty.” State

V.

(3)

t0 a jury trial, t0 confront his

Whether the defendant understood the

Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 507, 376 P.3d 707, 711

(2016) (quoting State V. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976)).
A11 of the evidence in the direct appeal record shows that Hollingsworth’s plea

knowing,

intelligent,

district court that

afﬁrmed

that “all

At

and voluntary.

was

the entry 0f plea hearing, Hollingsworth informed the

he ﬁlled out a guilty plea advisory form With his attorney’s assistance, and
of the answers” in

it

were

true.
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(8/10/16 Tr., p.9, L.24

—

p.1

1,

L.1.)

The form

asked,

among

other things,

“D0 you understand

defenses, both factual and legal, that

that

by pleading

guilty

you believe you may have

Hollingsworth checked “YES.” (R., p.73.) The form also asked

you plead

guilty,

you

in this case?,” to

“D0 you understand

Which Hollingsworth checked “YES.”

guilty?,” t0

that

and every allegation contained

are admitting the truth of each

Which you plead

charge(s) t0

you waive or give up any
which

When
in the

When

(Id.)

asked whether he understood that “no one, including vour attorney, can force you to plead

Whether he was “pleading guilty freely and voluntarily,” and Whether he was “pleading

guilty,”

guilty because” he

checked “YES”

“committed the

acts alleged in the information or indictment,” Hollingsworth

t0 all three questions.

(R., p.75.)

Hollingsworth circled

“YES” When asked

whether he “[swore] under penalty 0f perjury” that his “answers t0 these questions are true

and

correct,” and he signed and dated the form. (R., p.76.)

Moreover, the

shows

his plea

attorneys

tell

Ls.11-12.)

me

district court

was knowing,
that

you want

undertook a painstaking colloquy with Hollingsworth that

intelligent,

The court began by

and voluntary.

t0 plea[d] guilty. Is that

want you want

Hollingsworth responded, “Yes, Your honor.”

to

stating “[t]he

d0?” (8/10/16 TL,

(8/10/16 Tr., p.9, L.13.)

p.9,

The court

brought up the plea advisory form, asking “are there any questions that you answered even

though you didn’t understand What was being asked?”
Hollingsworth replied, “No.” (8/10/16
the plea advisory he

this

document

was “promising”

are true.” (8/10/16 Tr., p.10, L.23

“what you understand the plea agreement

“As

it

states in there,

L.1.) Then,

When asked t0

to be,” Hollingsworth could not

admitting t0 an unlawful crime.”

added).)
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p.10,

Ls.16-18.)

of the answers that you’ve given

all

— p.1 1,

Tr.,

Hollingsworth afﬁrmed that by signing

Tr., p.10, L.19.)

the court “that

(8/10/16

tell

have made

me

in

the court

it

plainer:

(8/10/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-5 (emphasis

Hollingsworth was also asked Whether he “had enough time to talk” t0 his attorney about

he afﬁrmed he had. (8/10/16

his decision;

any more time”; he afﬁrmed he did
attorney answered

all

not.

Tr., p.12, Ls.1 1-13.)

He was

(8/10/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-15.)

asked

if

And When

of your questions,” Hollingsworth said that she

did.

he “need[ed]

asked

if

“your

(8/10/16 Tr., p.12,

Hollingsworth also afﬁrmed that the “decision to plead guilty” was his and his

Ls.16-18.)

“alone”; and

afﬁrmed

was “completely voluntary”; and afﬁrmed

it

that

he “Want[ed] to enter a

now.” (8/10/16 TL, p.13, Ls.3-7; p.14, Ls.18—23.)

guilty plea

The

district court

L.18 — p.16, L.6.)

then read the charging language t0 Hollingsworth.

When

asked, “[t]o that charge

how do you

(8/10/16 Tr., p.15,

plead, guilty 0r not guilty,”

Hollingsworth stated “Guilty, Your Honor.” (8/10/16 TL, p.16, Ls.6-8.)

At

the court’s invitation, Hollingsworth then

his version

of the

gave—as

best he purported t0

remember—

facts:

consumed some alcohol. I went next door to
my eX-girlfriend’s house. I entered the garage. The garage door t0 the house
opened. She was there with the dog. I started t0 enter the house. There was a
surprised—I confronted Mr. Smith. I had never seen him before, didn’t know he
was there.
A:

worked

I

late.

I

We had a struggle.

came home.

I

my hand.

She had a habitual—
We had a co-dependent drinking problem. I was getting something out of the
freezer right next to the door. At that time of night she was in the bath and I’d be
trying to see the dog. We were both surprised. There was a struggle.

And
all

I felt

of the

that

I

Unfortunately

was

details.

I

I

in great danger

d0 know for a

had a knife

in

and I’m sure Mr. Smith feels—I do not

now

fact

after

many months of being

recall

unclear

What had happened.

And the part that—I understand that it’s
did

it

willfully.

I

did not go there to

unlawfully because I did stab him. [feel I

harm anyone.

Q. Did you stab Mr. Smith?
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Your Honor. T0 be honest, I d0 not recall that.
evidence shows Mr. Smith was stabbed many times and I did recognize the

A.

I

The

don’t recall that,

in the photographs, but I’ve

knife

been suffering from head trauma for months and

I

do

not recall that part.

One

Q. S0 you said a couple 0fthings that concern me.

you are suggesting the
and I accept your guilty plea,

potential defense ofself-defense. Ifyou plead guilty

you

will be giving

A.

Yes,

Q.

You

up thatpotential defense.

D0 you

are also, not to

my

ears, speciﬁcally

acknowledging the act that would

D0 you still want t0 plead guilty?

guilty 0f this crime.

A. I believe I stabbed Mr. Smith, Your Honor, and
(8/10/16 Tr., p.16, L.9

p.

1

8,

L.4

— p.18, L.3 (emphasis

that point the district court

provided

state

(set forth herein in the

— p.19,

L.20.)

is

it

was an unlawful act.

added).)

asked the

state for additional factual support,

which the

statement of facts and course 0f proceedings). (8/10/16 Tr.,

The court resumed

Mr. Hollingsworth,

Q.

understand that?

Your Honor.

make you

At

is

its

colloquy With Hollingsworth:

there anything that’s contained in the charging

language 0fthe information that [just readyou that you disagree with?
A. N0, Your Honor.
Q.

D0 you

A.

Yes,

still

want

me to

accept your guilty plea?

Your Honor.

(8/10/16 Tr., p.19, L.21

— p.20,

L.8 (emphasis added).)

Like the plea advisory, Hollingsworth’s sworn statements in the colloquy clearly afﬁrm
the

district

court’s

ﬁnding

at

sentencing:

voluntarily entered” and that “there

is

that

Hollingsworth’s plea was “knowingly and

a sufﬁcient factual basis for the plea.” (8/10/16 Tr., p.20,

Ls.4-8.)
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Hollingsworth

fails t0

show otherwise on

appeal.

As shown
come

statements speak for themselves, and Hollingsworth does not

above, the prior sworn

close to overcoming the

record that demonstrates the plea was proper, and properly accepted by the court. Nevertheless,

some 0f Hollingsworth’s

incorrect arguments

Hollingsworth contends that “the

on appeal warrant

further

district court failed to

advise”

the charge.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12 (emphasis omitted).) This claim

by

the record.

The

district court

I

just read

is

him “of the elements of
demonstrably disproved

read the charging language t0 Hollingsworth in open court, and

asked Hollingsworth, point-blank:
the information that

comment.

“is there

you

that

anything that’s contained in the charging language of

you disagree with?”

(8/10/16 T11, p.19, Ls.21-24.)

Hollingsworth answered, just as bluntly, “No, Your Honor.”

(8/10/16 Tr., p.19, L25.)

Hollingsworth’s elements-advice claim simply has n0 support in the record.

Hollingsworth makes a hasty retreat to an adj acent point.
to willfully inﬂict force

upon another

in self—defense,”

He

and reasons

argues that

“it is

that his “plea

not voluntary because he was not advised of the elements 0f self—defense.”

0f

not a crime

guilt[y]

was

(Appellant’s brief,

pp.12-13.)

This claim
defendants

fails

who wish

too.

Idaho courts are not required to recite potential defenses t0

to plead guilty in order to accept a plea.

authority that holds otherwise, Hollingsworth has failed t0 cite t0

breaking citation t0

it

970 (1996); Patterson
729 (2011)

in his reply brief.

V. State,

(reiterating

authorities supporting the

that

m

I.C.R. 11(c).

it,

If there is

and has waived any

any
late-

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

Dep’t of Health

&

Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718,

appellants are “required t0 identify legal issues and provide

arguments in the opening brief” to preserve
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issues).

Beyond

that,

even assuming the

with Hollingsworth, that

is

district court

exactly what the district court did.

uttered the phase “self—defense” at his plea hearing.

it

upon

Tr.,

itself t0 point

p.17, Ls.16-18

was required

to discuss potential defenses

Hollingsworth himself never

(ﬂ 8/10/16 Tr.)

It

was

the court that took

out that Hollingsworth had a ‘jyotential defense ofself-defense.

(emphasis added).)

Going a

”

(8/10/16

step further, the court explained to the

Hollingsworth that “Ifyou plead guilty and I accept your guilty plea, you will be giving up that
potential defense,

”

Which Hollingsworth swore, under

oath, that

he understood.

(8/10/16 Tr.,

p.17, Ls.18-22 (emphasis added).)

So Hollingsworth’s core nitpick—that the court did not “advise[]” him “of the elements
of self—defense”

accordingly

fails.

court explained the “elements” of self—defense to Hollingsworth

court told Hollingsworth in the plainest possible terms that he

t0 assert,

Which a

proceeded to plead

guilty plea

guilty.

It

would give

was

up.

his right to

is

beside the point—because the

had a

potential self—defense claim

Hollingsworth afﬁrmed he understood

do

so.

E

Godinez

V.

choice,” and that “all criminal defendants

may be

required to

make important

criminal proceedings have been initiated”) (emphasis in original);

480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (“The criminal process,

making of

like the rest

difﬁcult judgments’ as t0

Town

among

defendant”).
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is

and

of the legal system,

Which course

a “strategic

decisions once

of Newton

Carolina V. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea
“represents a voluntary and intelligent choice

this,

Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398

(1993) (explaining that “Whether t0 raise one or more afﬁrmative defenses”

situations requiring ‘the

Whether the

(Appellant’s brief, p.13 (emphasis added).)

is

V.

Rumerv,

replete with

t0 follow”);

is

North

proper where

the alternative courses of action

open

it

to the

Hollingsworth additionally argues that “the

to

support the charge.”

argument, this one

is

“all

When Hollingsworth

0f the details” 0f the stabbing, the

provide a factual basis for the crime.
(8/10/16 Tr., p.18, L.6

(8/10/16 Tr., p.17, L.1

—

p.19, L.20.)

—

district court

p.18, L.5.)

here.

He

unclear

cites t0

why Hollingsworth

Schmidt

V. State,

concludes that there

and alleges

alleged that he

asked the

The

state

state t0

provided a

Hollingsworth never disputed that factual

basis and the district court accepted the plea. (8/10/16 TL, p.19, L.21

It is

a factual basis

Like the preceding

(Appellant’s brief, p.16 (emphasis omitted).)

demonstrably disproved by the record.

could not remember

factual basis.

district court failed t0 establish

this case

is

shows

no

— p.20,

L.8.)

m

factual basis to support the plea

“all three

exceptions” the

Court identiﬁed which require an “inquir[y] in to the factual basis of the plea”: Where a
defendant

is

(a)

does not recall the facts 0f the incident which resulted in the offense charged, or (b)

unwilling 0r unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime, or

Idaho 340, 345, 647 P.2d 796, 801 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing North Carolina

The ﬁnal category

is

couples

(Appellant’s brief, p.17); Schmidt V. State, 103

his plea with continued assertion 0f innocence.”

(1970)).

(c)

V.

Alford, 400 U.S. 25

clearly inapplicable here, insofar as Hollingsworth never

asserted innocence during the entry of plea, and only repeatedly asserted his guilt.

once

(m 8/10/16

Tr., pp.9-20.)

m

But even assuming
entirely With

the incident” and/or

mandate:

it

was

and

that the ﬁrst

m1.

was “unable

two exceptions apply, the proceedings below comported

Because Hollingsworth arguably did “not
to

admit his participation,” the

t0 “inquire into the factual basis

recall the facts

district court

0f

had a simple

of the plea, either t0 dispel the doubt 0r to allow

the defendant t0 plead anew.” Schmidt, 103 Idaho at 345,
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647 P.2d

at 801.

That

is

exactly What the district court did.

by asking

the state to provide one.

T11, p.17,

L.23

and

—

p.20, L.8.)

The

By doing

m1, and Hollingsworth

fails to

It

state did so.

“inquire[d] into the factual basis 0f the plea”

(E 8/10/16

Hollingsworth never objected.

so the district court unmistakably complied with

show

m,

that the court “failed t0 establish a factual basis t0

support the charge.” (Appellant’s brief, p.16 (emphasis omitted).)

Hollingsworth quibbles with the fact that “the District Court never asked Appellant

Whether he agreed With the prosecution’s rendition 0f the
this

makes no

Of course

sense.

facts.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.) But

the district court did not check to see “whether [Hollingsworth]

agreed” With the state’s depiction of the stabbing; the whole reason the
state’s factual basis is

truly

because Hollingsworth claimed he did not remember

had n0 memory 0f the stabbing he cannot seriously complain

weigh

in

on

he did not agree with [the

with the

that

If

it.

asked for the
Hollingsworth

no one asked him

to

it.

Hollingsworth extends

inferences

district

we can draw

state’s version

Tr., p.17, Ls.1-2.)

many time” and
after the state

this illogical

state’s]

premise by musing

version of the facts.”

“[i]t

was obvious

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

But any

here go in the opposite direction. Hollingsworth never said he disagreed

0f the

facts;

he only said he could not “recall

all

0f the details.” (8/10/16

Hollingsworth also testiﬁed that the “evidence shows Mr. Smith was stabbed

that “I believe

gave

its

I

stabbed Mr. Smith.” (8/10/16

T11, p.17,

L.11

—

p.18, L.3.)

And

version 0f the facts, the district court asked Hollingsworth, “is there

anything that’s contained in the charging language of the information that
disagree With?” (8/10/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-24.) Hollingsworth stated: “No,

TL, p.19, L25.)

at this point that

Thus, the only “obvious” point here
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is

I

just read

you

that

you

Your Honor.” (8/10/16

the one borne out

by

the record.

Hollingsworth never disagreed With the

state’s version

of the

facts,

never disagreed With the

charging language, and steadfastly wanted, until the very end, to plead guilty.

Hollingsworth concludes

this

through the looking glass, he ﬁnds

towards the obvious incongruity
asserted innocence.”

it

it

Gazing

argument With a surreal admonishment.
“surprising

how

little

concern the District Court showed

faced—Appellant expressed a desire

(Appellant’s brief, p.19.)

ﬁllly

to plead guilty, but

This twilight-zone View of the transcript gets

everything wrong. The district court expressed the utmost concern by sua sponte raising the self-

defense issue, and by asking the state for a factual basis for the plea. The only “incongruity” the
court

by

saw was

in Hollingsworth’s purported

eliciting a factual basis for the plea.

nothing close to

it.

He

memory

And

Which were

ﬁlled, entirely properly,

Hollingsworth never once “asserted innocence”—

repeatedly insisted on his guilt, 0n the unlawfulness of his conduct, and

0n the correctness 0f the charging language.
intelligent,

gaps,

In sum, Hollingsworth’s plea

and voluntary, and properly accepted by the

district court.

He

fails to

was knowing,

show

otherwise.

II.

Show The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To Withdraw
His Plea Because It Was Unsupported; Alternatively, Hollingsworth Fails To Show Any Error

Hollingsworth Fails To

On The Merits
Below Hollingsworth ﬁled a “Motion

t0

Withdraw Guilty Plea and Reconsiderﬂ

Sentence” that sought relief Via I.C.R. 33(0), 35(a), and/or 35(b).

(R., pp.137-39.)

The

district

court denied the motion, With respect to every theory 0f relief, because Hollingsworth had “not

presented the Court with any argument or authority to support his motion.” (R., pp. 149-5 1 .)

This was undoubtedly correct.

As

a general rule, parties are required to support their

claims with “propositions of law, authority, 0r argument.”

P.2d

at 970.

E m,

129 Idaho

at

263, 923

Hollingsworth’s motion did not meaningfully discuss the applicable criminal rules,
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cite t0

any criminal cases, 0r present any cogent argument under the applicable criminal law

(E R., pp.137-38.)

standards.

Instead,

he simply argued for the

notice of his post-conviction pleadings, and rely

post-conviction case as a surrogate.

district court t0 take judicial

0n the “proof and arguments”

(R., p.138.)

set forth in the

This was insufﬁcient, because the post-

conviction pleadings did not contain the relevant criminal case arguments and authorities.

PCR., pp.10-39, 72-83, 124-160, 169-73.)

post-conviction proceedings,

from criminal proceedings. State

entirely separate

714 (2003); State

m,

And

V.

Creech, 132 Idaho

1,

V. Jakoski,

9-10, n.1, 966 P.2d

(E

by deﬁnition,

are

139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 71
9-10, n.1 (1998);

1,

1,

Saykhamchone

127 Idaho 319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995) (holding “[a]n application for post-

conviction relief

criminal action”).

is

in the nature

0f a

civil

proceeding, entirely distinct from the underlying

Hollingsworth was therefore required to

citing t0 the correct authority

litigate his

criminal case motion

and making relevant arguments, as opposed

t0

by

simply attempting t0

import his post—conviction pleadings as handy stunt doubles.

Moreover, denial of the I.C.R. 33(0) and I.C.R. 35(b) components 0f Hollingsworth’s

motion was appropriate for an additional reason: the
those issues.

A

district court’s “jurisdiction t0

judgment becomes ﬁnal,

0n appeal.”

either

by

district court

amend

or set aside a judgment expires once the

expiration of the time for appeal or afﬁrmance of the judgment

State V. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711,

not include any provision extending the jurisdiction 0f the

motion

t0

withdraw a guilty plea”;

lacked jurisdiction t0 rule on

this

means

trial

714 (2003). I.R.C. 33(0) “does

court for the purpose 0f hearing a

that “the district court

n0 longer had jurisdiction

to

hear” Hollingsworth’s motion t0 Withdraw his plea, which was ﬁled well after the expiration of

time to ﬁle an appeal.

motion was ﬁled well

M,
after the

139 Idaho

at

355, 79 P.3d at 714.

Likewise, Hollingsworth’s

120-day limit for ﬁling I.C.R. 35(b) motions.

23

(R., pp.82, 138.)

And

while Hollingsworth received the limited post-conviction relief of reentry of the criminal

judgment, that was expressly “so that [he]

may

ﬁle additional motions challenging his plea.

jurisdiction t0 rule

ﬁle an appeal”—not so that Hollingsworth could

(PCR., p.122.)

Because the

district court

0n the I.C.R 33(0) and I.C.R. 35(b) components of his motion,

it

lacked

was properly

denied.

On

appeal, Hollingsworth fails to

applying I.C.R. 33(0), 35(a), and/or 35(b).

show

pleadings.

district court erred4

(Appellant’s brief, p.21.)

Hollingsworth has yet to

cite

continues to avoid citing any authority

(E Appellant’s

under the relevant criminal case standards, that the
simply argues that the

He

error.

district court erred.

by not taking

This alone

brief, pp.20-21.)

is

Nor does he

(E

id.)

argue,

Instead,

he

judicial notice of the post-conviction

fatal t0 this issue

0n appeal.

Because

any criminal-case authority, or make any meaningful argument

about the criminal rules, he has waived any merits—based challenge t0 the court’s order, and
necessarily fails to

show

error.

m,

129 Idaho

In any event, Hollingsworth fails to

was wrong 0n
ILC

herein.

the merits.

263, 923 P.2d at 970.

the district court’s order denying his motion

Hollingsworth’s plea was entirely proper, as demonstrated in section

Moreover, Hollingsworth has never demonstrated “that the original sentence was

unduly harsh 0r excessive, 0r that

4

show

at

Hollingsworth

fails t0

show

it

error

has become so in light 0f new and additional information.”

on

this point too.

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.)

Even

assuming Hollingsworth properly supported his judicial-notice claim with argument and
authority he fails t0 show the district court erred, because he fails t0 show his blanket request t0
take “notice of the entirety of the ﬁle,”

combined with a

list

0f speciﬁc pleadings, came close t0

“delineat[ing] with speciﬁcity the portion 0f the ﬁle or transcript that supports the adjudicative
fact 0r facts relevant to the

claim 0r claims before the court.”

Rome V.

State,

164 Idaho 407, 414,

431 P.3d 242, 249 (2018). Moreover, Hollingsworth fails t0 show that post-conviction pleadings
“were relevant and otherwise admissible in evidence” in the criminal case. I.R.E. 201 Li. at 415,
;

431 P.3d

at

250.
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(R.,

p.150 (citing State

Hollingsworth

made

that challenge,

it

fails

Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999)).)

V.

Even

if

a Viable motion t0 withdraw his plea 0r reduce his sentence, and preserved

on the

merits.

III.

Show The Post—Conviction Court Erred BV Granting The State’s First
Motion For Summary Disposition And Dismissing The Maioritv Of The Claims In The Petition
Hollingsworth Fails To

A.

Introduction

Hollingsworth argues the court below erred by summarily dismissing his post-conviction
claim challenging his plea.
court erred

(Appellant’s brief, pp.21-24.)

by summarily dismissing

all

He

also contends the post-conviction

but twos 0f his claims of ineffective assistance of

trial

counsel. (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-30.)

These claims
demonstrating

trial

district court erred in

Standard

fact.

plea

was

The

show

a genuine issue 0f material fact

invalid, 0r 2) that, with respect to the

counsel gave ineffective assistance.

As

summarily

such, he has failed t0

show

the

summarily dismissing these claims.

dismissal

Workman

is

appropriate where the petitioner’s evidence raises no genuine issue

V. State,

144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007).

of a summary dismissal 0f a post-conviction

5

to

Of Review6

Summary
0f material

Below, Hollingsworth failed

1) that his guilty

dismissed issues,

B.

fail.

district court

petition, “this

granted relief 0n the claim that

trial

On

review

Court Will determine whether a

counsel was ineffective for failing t0 ﬁle

an appeal. (PCR., pp.122, 473.) The district court eventually denied the claim that trial counsel
ineffective by advising Hollingsworth to waive the preliminary hearing (2/19/19 Tr., p.1 1,

was

Ls.4-1
6

1),

Which

is

addressed in Section

V herein.

This standard of review additionally applies to Section

be rewritten.
25

V below, but to conserve space Will not

genuine issue 0f fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
afﬁdavits on ﬁle and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the

non-moving

C.

party.” Li. at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.

Guilty Plea Claim

“The longstanding

test for

determining the validity of a guilty plea

represents a voluntary and intelligent choice

among

Whether the plea

the alternative courses of action open to the

defendant.” Lint V. State, 145 Idaho 472, 481, 180 P.3d 51

V. State,

is

141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004)).

1,

520

(Ct.

App. 2008)

(citing

Dunlap

“For a guilty plea t0 be valid, the entire

record must demonstrate that the plea was entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent

manner.”

Workman, 144 Idaho

at 527,

164 P.3d

Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 1193, 1194 (2007)).
in

at

807 (2007)

As shown by the

Section ILC above, Hollingsworth’s plea

was

(citing State V. Heredia,

144

criminal case record and explained

self—evidently “voluntary,

knowing, and

intelligent.”

On post-conviction,

Hollingsworth raised the following challenges t0 his plea:

Petitioner contends that the Court erred in accepting the Petitioner’s guilty plea in

three respects: (1) because Petitioner informed the Court three times that he did

not intend t0 hurt the Victim; (2) because the Court failed t0 adequately advise
Petitioner of the elements 0f the crime at issue, Aggravated Battery, 0r the

elements of self—defense; and, (3) because Petitioner was not competent t0 enter a
guilty plea.

(PCR., p.1 13.)

The post-conviction court

correctly rejected all of these theories.

conviction court pointed out that Hollingsworth’s “‘intent’ t0

harm

First,

the post-

the Victim in this case

was

not an element 0f the charged crime,” and “the Court’s inquiry during Petitioner’s plea hearing

was proper pursuant

to all

of the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 11.” (PCR., p.1

26

14.)

This

was

correct.

Aggravated battery

ILC

forth in Section

(Ct.

herein.

is

LC.

a general intent crime, and the plea

entirely proper, as set

18-907; State V. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 400, 3 P.3d 67, 78

§

App. 2000) (explaining “there

was

is

nothing in the language 0f the aggravated battery statute t0

indicate that the legislature intended t0

impose a speciﬁc

intent requirement

on

this elevated

form

of simple battery”).
Next, the court correctly rejected the claim that the court “failed t0 adequately advise”

(PCR., p.1 13-1 15.)

Hollingsworth.

The court noted

that “Idaho Criminal

contain any requirement that the Court inform a defendant of any 0r
available to the defendant,” and any event, the court

Rule 11(0) does not

all

potential defenses

“drew [Hollingsworth’s] attention

to the

possible availability of” claiming self—defense. (PCR., p.1 15.)

Finally,

the district court correctly rejected Hollingsworth’s claim that he

was not

competent during the entry 0f plea. The court relied 0n the record, Which showed “that the Court
clearly inquired

Petitioner

about Petitioner’s understanding of the proceedings multiple times, that

answered

all

of the Court’s questions clearly and

indicated t0 the Court that he understood everything that

articulately,

and

that Petitioner

was being asked 0f him both

orally

and

in writing.” (Id.)

On

appeal, Hollingsworth fails to

show

that the district court erred, or that there is a

genuine issue of fact surrounding the propriety 0f the plea.
signiﬁcance 0f his plea testimony—waving

Court

at the

it

away

He pooh-poohs

into oblivion the

as “superﬁcial statements before the District

plea hearing”—and argues the district court should have focused instead on

information in the advisory form purportedly showing he was not “mentally competent t0

understand the process.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.22.)

Hollingsworth also argues that his

handwritten notes, purportedly written prior to the entry of plea, also show “he had signiﬁcant

27

questions and issues that went unanswered.”

A11 of these arguments

(Appellant’s brief, p.23.)

lack merit.

As

make

a threshold matter, Hollingsworth did not

entry hearing.

(m Appellant’s, p.22.)
And

(8/10/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-7.)

He gave sworn

“superﬁcial statements” at the plea

testimony under the penalty of perjury.

Hollingsworth’s sworn testimony was that there were no

“questions that [he] answered even though” he “didn’t understand What

“had enough time

to talk” to his attorney;

and

that his attorney

was being asked”;

answered

all

that

he

0f his questions.

(8/10/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-19; p.12, Ls.1 1-18.)

Hollingsworth counters

that

declarations that contradict his prior

pp.14,

21,

True enough.

72).)

he made “speciﬁc

sworn testimony.
But while the

assertions”

V. State,

his

post-conviction

(Appellant’s brief, p.22 (citing

district

court

Hollingsworth’s unrebutted allegations as true and t0 construe

Charboneau

in

all

was required

to

PCR,
accept

inferences in his favor,

140 Idaho 789, 793-94, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112-13 (2004),

it

was not required

to accept as true Hollingsworth’s statements that contradicted the record in the underlying

criminal case.

T0

the contrary, courts are not “required t0 conduct an evidentiary hearing t0 determine

which” 0f a

petitioner’s “contrary statements is

_, 438 P.3d 787, 791
declarations

made

in

(Ct.

App. 2019).

open court”

0f verity.” United States

V.

more

credible.”

Campos

Instead, courts routinely rely

at the entry

V. State,

0n

165 Idaho 90,

petitioners”

“solemn

0f plea, Which, ex ante, “carry a strong presumption

Rivera—Ramirez, 715 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1983). Likewise, courts

are entitled t0 “reject[ petitioners’] after—the-fact statements t0 the contrary.” Li.

This

is

precisely

district court is

Why the

Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Campos‘s contention “that the

required to conduct an evidentiary hearing when, as here, the statements he

28

makes
Idaho

m

in post-conviction are contrary to the statements

_,

at

situation

438 P.3d

at 791.

Instead, the

where the appellate courts have held

he made incident to the guilty plea.” 165
Court concluded that “this

summary

was

on Hollingsworth’s prior sworn testimony, over

entitled to rely

exactly the

that the post-conviction claims are belied

record and subject t0

dismissal.”

is

This case

Li.

is

by

the

the same: the post-conviction court

his late-breaking, self-

serving declarations that contradicted them.

And

While

it is

generally true that additional evidence might tip the scales “in support 0f

the post-conviction claim,” warranting an evidentiary hearing

t0

show

(ﬂ Q,

n.1),

Hollingsworth

that the plea advisory form, the PSI, 0r his purported handwritten notes

anything.

fails

were evidence of

Hollingsworth points out that he “checked both boxes” in question 5 in the plea

advisory form, and he argues he did so “because he was suffering from ‘health disorders.”’
(Appellant’s brief, p.22 (citing R., p.71).) This assumes too much.

“Have you ever been diagnosed With a mental health
presently suffering from one.

(R.,

p.71

actually asked,

disorder,” not whether Hollingsworth

(emphasis added).)

Hollingsworth repeatedly self—reported a traumatic brain injury

it

The question

And

(ﬂ, gg,

was

while the PSI shows
PSI, pp.24-25, 29, 35),

also stated that Hollingsworth “scored in the no/minimal range 0f the Cognitive Impairment

Screen.”

(PSI, p.36.)

The PSI

also

shows

that Hollingsworth

had a

CT

scan on his head

following the attack, Which revealed his brain was “[n]0rmal-appearing,” his skull and scalp were
“[u]nremarkable,” and the examining doctor concluded that—other than some eye “tissue
swelling seen bilaterally”—there

Finally,

was “[n]0 acute

intracranial process.” PSI, p.707.

even assuming that Hollingsworth’s “handwritten notes,” purportedly written the

day before he pleaded

(ﬂ PCR., pp.33-34), show some prior confusion about his guilty plea, he

29

still fails

to

show any

error.

Trial counsel explained that they discussed the advisory

times before the hearing—once the day before, and once the morning

form two

of:

MS. HALES: Your Honor,

I took this form to the jail yesterday afternoon and
met with Mr. Hollingsworth. We went over a few of the questions. I left it with
him t0 be able t0 work on it and read through it yesterday and this morning. And
then When he got here this morning, I met with him again and he had a few
questions 0n some 0f the questions. And we went through it and talked about

those questions.

THE COURT:

Okay. Does your handwriting appear anywhere on

this

form?

MS. HALES: No.

THE COURT:

So

I’d note that there’s

checking some of the boxes and black ink

some blue ink used predominately
is

in

used as well.

MS. HALES: Your Honor, the black ink were the questions that he understood
and answered When he was—after I dropped the form off with him at the jail
yesterday. The blue ink was the pen that I handed him this morning as we were
going through the questions that he needed some clariﬁcation 0n.
(8/10/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-23 (emphasis added).)

Thus, Hollingsworth’s “handwritten notes” only afﬁrm that
recalled their discussions.

No

doubt Hollingsworth had questions for his attorney before he

pleaded, as his purported notes appear to show.

trial

counsel spent additional time With

that

he needed some clariﬁcation 0n.”

additional time

was sufﬁcient

counsel accurately

trial

t0 clear

him

(E PCR., pp.33-34.)

But

that is precisely

why

the following morning, “going through the questions

(8/10/16 TL, p.7, Ls.20-23.)

And

it is

clear that this

up Hollingsworth’s questions, because he then swore,

under oath, that he “had enough time t0 talk” t0 his attorney and she answered

all

of his

questions. (8/10/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-18; p.12, Ls.1 1-18.)

Thus, other than Hollingsworth’s contradictory statements, the information in the postconviction record only tends t0 support the post-conviction court’s conclusions: “the Court

30

clearly inquired about [Hollingsworth’s]

Hollingsworth

“answered

all

of

the

understanding 0f the proceedings multiple times,”
Court’s

questions

and

clearly

articulately,”

and

Hollingsworth “indicated t0 the Court that he understood everything that was being asked of him
both orally and in writing.” (PCR., p.1 16.) The post-conviction court therefore correctly found
that Hollingsworth’s guilty plea

was properly accepted “pursuant

Idaho Criminal Rule 11.” (PCR., p.1 15.) Hollingsworth

of material

D.

fails to

to all

show

0f the requirements of

there

was a genuine

issue

fact to the contrary.

Ineffective Assistance

Of Counsel Claims

In a well-reasoned, thoughtful opinion, the post-conviction court cited to Strickland V.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and other controlling authority, t0 determine the vast majority

of Hollingsworth’s ineffective assistance 0f counsel claims were subject t0 summary dismissal.
(PCR., pp.1 16-21.) For example, the post-conviction court examined Hollingsworth’s claim that

trial

counsel gave ineffective assistance 0f counsel because she “was intimidated” by the

prosecutor.

failed t0

(PCR., p.117.)

The court summarily dismissed

show deﬁcient performance; he did not show

an objective standard 0f reasonableness.”
prejudice:

he “failed to show

intimidation,” he

For

how

“would not have pled

this claim,

(Id.)

that

this

claim because Hollingsworth

“Ms. Hales’ performance

trial

below

Moreover, Hollingsworth failed to show

or Why, but for the

alleged inexperience,

fear,

and

guilty.” (Id.)

and the other summarily dismissed claims, the post-conviction correctly

applied the controlling authority and concluded Hollingsworth failed t0

material fact that

fell

show a genuine

issue 0f

counsel performed deﬁciently, or prejudiced him, or both. (PCR., pp.1 16-

31

21.)

The

adopts the court’s reasoning as t0 the summarily dismissed claims, and

state

incorporates

it

herein in

full.

For

all

of these claims, Hollingsworth

fails to

show any error.

IV.

Show The Post-Conviction Court Erred BV Denying His Reconsideration
On A Cumulative Error Theory But That Failed T0 Show More Than One

Hollingsworth Fails To

Motion That Relied

Error

After the post-conviction

dismissal, Hollingsworth ﬁled a

court partially

Motion

granted the

for Reconsideration, in

Petitioner believes the Court has erred in

its

state’s

motion for summary

Which he argued the following:

analysis of the several claims raised

0f the claims

in these proceedings for the reason that the Court has addressed each
in isolation rather than

Viewing the several claims as a Whole for their cumulative

effect.

(PCR., p.161.)

Hollingsworth

because “[t]here were

many

moved

the court t0 reconsider

deﬁciencies,

is

dismissal order

which Viewed from a cumulative perspective,

demonstrate the ineffective assistance 0f counsel.”
claimed, a “fair conclusion here

summary

its

that Petitioner has

(PCR., p.167.)

met

his

burden

As

at the

such, Hollingsworth

summary

disposition

stage.” (Id.)

The post-conviction court properly denied

the motion.

(PCR., pp.176-77.)

First,

Hollingsworth has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine, Where multiple individuallyharmless errors render a

m,

129 Idaho

Even

at

trial

even applies

to

summary

dismissal proceedings.

if this doctrine is applicable here, the district court correctly

observed that While

show

the absence 0f a fair

and 0f themselves,

may

in the aggregate

under the cumulative error doctrine, a “necessary predicate

doctrine

is

m

263, 923 P.2d at 970.

“series 0f errors, harmless in

trial”

unfair,

a ﬁnding of

more than one

error.”

to the application

(PCR., p.176 (quoting State

32

V. Per_ry,

of the

150 Idaho

The court

209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010) (internal citations 0mitted)).
this arithmetic did

rightly pointed out

not apply here:

The Court notes

that, in fact, at this

point the Court has not found any errors in

this case.... Petitioner’s contention that “[t]his

Court has already found that the

waiver of the preliminary hearing was a deﬁciency”

is

mistaken. The Court simply

Why

determined that the lack of evidence in the record as t0
hearing was waived, combined with the

the preliminary

Amended Complaint adding

a sentencing

enhancement, was enough t0 warrant an evidentiary hearing.
(PCR., pp.176-77.) “Thus,” the court concluded,
doctrine of cumulative errors

On

is

had not found “any

errors in this case

and the

inapplicable.” (PCR., p.177.)

appeal Hollingsworth

irrelevant accounting miX-up;

it

fails t0

show

the district court erred.

At

best,

he identiﬁes an

he alleges that the court should have included the failure-to-appeal

claim in the tally of errors:

The

District Court reasoned that

it

had not found any

errors 0r “irregularities in

This was clear error—the District Court had already granted

the case t0 date.

[Hollingsworth’s] claim that

trial

counsel had failed to ﬁle an appeal.

signiﬁcance of this failing should not be understated, for

ﬁmdamental

failure t0

Consequently,

it

was

it

reﬂects

trial

The

counsel’s

understand the duties and role of a defense counsel.

error for the District Court t0

have denied the

MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION.
(Appellant’s brief, p.35 (internal citations omitted.)

This

claim

is

is still

insufﬁcient t0

than one error.”

Per_ry,

By

Because even

if the failure-to-appeal

deﬁnition, cumulative error necessarily requires “a ﬁnding 0f

150 Idaho

Hollingsworth has only identiﬁed,

and

error.

counted as a single error—a reasonable argument—then Hollingsworth has only

identiﬁed a single error.

error,

show cumulative

fails to

show

at

230, 245 P.3d at 982 (emphasis added).

at best, a single error,

his reconsideration

he necessarily

motion had any merit.
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It

fails t0

more

Because

show cumulative

was properly denied.

V.
Hollingsworth Fails To

Show The

BV Concluding That Trial
Of Counsel BV Advising Hollingsworth To Waive

Post-Conviction Court Erred

Counsel Did Not Give Ineffective Assistance

His Preliminary Hearing
A.

Introduction

After the post-conviction court dismissed the bulk of the claims in the post-conviction

petition,

left:

and granted

relief

on the claim

Hollingsworth’s allegation that

advising

him

t0

waive

that counsel failed to ﬁle

an appeal, a single claim was

counsel gave ineffective assistance 0f counsel by

trial

his preliminary hearing.

The post-conviction court

(PCR., p.177.)

dismissed this claim after concluding there were two strategic reasons for counsel t0 advise

Hollingsworth to waive the preliminary hearing.
appeal, he fails t0

show any

(2/21/19 Tr., p.10, L.9

—

p.11, L.11.)

On

error.

Counsel Had At Least

Two

Reasons For Waiving The Preliminary
Hearing; Moreover, Hollingsworth Did Not Show AnV Preiudice That Flowed From The
Waiver Of The Hearing

B.

Trial

A

Strategic

criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel and t0 counsel’s “reasonably

effective assistance.” U.S. Const. and. VI; Strickland V. Washington,

T0 prove

that counsel

was

ineffective, a defendant

that 1) “counsel’s representation fell

“there

is

must

satisfy a

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

tWO-prong

test

and show both

below an objective standard 0f reasonableness,” and 2)

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 0f the

proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland,

466 U.S.

at

687-96; State

V. Elison,

135

Idaho 546, 551, 21 P.3d 483, 488 (2001). T0 meet the burden 0f showing prejudice where there

is

a guilty plea, “the defendant must

counsel’s errors, he

v.

show

would not have pleaded

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

guilty

Lockhart, 474 U.s. 52, 59 (1985).

34

and would have insisted on going

to trial.

ﬂ

A

court’s “scrutiny 0f counsel’s performance

therefore, a reviewing court

must be highly

“must indulge a strong presumption

Within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

on review;

deferential”

that counsel’s

Strickland,

conduct

466 U.S.

falls

689.

at

Accordingly, counsel’s tactical and strategic decisions “Will not be second-guessed 0n appeal
unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law 0r other

Howard

shortcomings capable 0f objective evaluation.”

126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d

V. State,

261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).

With regard

to counsel’s

Strickland‘s standards “require

As

the

judgment

calls

0n

investigations, the

Supreme Court held

that

n0 special ampliﬁcation”:

Court 0f Appeals concluded, strategic choices made after thorough

investigation

0f law

and

facts

relevant

unchallengeable; and strategic choices

made

to

options

plausible

after less than

are

Virtually

complete investigation

are reasonable precisely t0 the extent that reasonable professional

judgments

support the limitations 0n investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty t0

make

reasonable investigations 0r to

make

a reasonable decision that

makes

any ineffectiveness case, a particular

particular investigations unnecessary. In

decision not t0 investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in

all

the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.

Strickland,

466 U.S.

at

690-91.

In other words, “the duty t0 investigate does not force defense

lawyers t0 scour the globe 0n the off chance something Will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel

may draw
Rompilla

a line

V.

when

they have good reason t0 think further investigation would be a waste.”

issues to the exclusion 0f others, there

is

App. 2006)

(citing

Yarborough

V.

a result “[w]hen counsel focuses 0n

some

a strong presumption that he or she did so for tactical

reasons rather than through sheer neglect.” Suits

(Ct.

As

Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005).

V. State,

Gentry, 540 U.S.

The post-conviction court concluded

1,

143 Idaho 160, 164, 139 P.3d 762, 766
8 (2003)).

that trial counsel

advising Hollingsworth to waive the preliminary hearing.
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had two

strategic reasons for

(2/21/19 Tr., p.10, L.9

—

p.1

1,

L.1

1.)

First,

found that

it

“it is

a reasonable explanation in

client not to further antagonize the State,

my View that

which had an

[trial

offer

would counsel a

counsel]

on the

table at the time the

preliminary hearing was waived, in order t0 maintain that.” (2/21/19 T11, p.10, Ls.14-18.) The
court then found that “another strategic reason” not t0 g0 t0 preliminary hearing and “put Ms.

Darner 0n the stand even

if” trial

counsel

intended to attack her credibility

“still

at trial,”

avoiding “telegraph[ing] t0 that witness What kinds of questions” would be asked
(2/21/19 Tr., p.10, L.19 —p.1

1,

testimony that “the risk 0f making

even more upset in

the Victim

the preliminary hearing.” (Dep. Tr., p.1 18, L.17

T11,

p.166, L. 14

her

at the

trial”;

t0

— p.1 19,

this case

and putting more

and “[Darner’s]

— p.167,

we

decided t0 go t0

“[s]he’s going t0 be expecting that at trial

stories

even more.” (Dep.

Tr.,

that,

it

t0

The Victim did not have

t0 attack her

now

and

I

attacked

not a strategyl can use at

and maybe even had time

p.167, Ls.2-8.)

afﬁrmed

at

peripheral in this case.” (Dep.

wanted

trial, that’s

could get

would not be worth

it

state.

was somewhat

credibility

L.2.) “Plus,” counsel explained, “if I

preliminary hearing and

enhance her

offer,

questions and strategies to the

trial

we

L.16.) Hales additionally

of the minimal value a preliminary hearing would

“credibility” issues,

at trial.

in the record, including Hales’s

pressure 0n the prosecutor” to seek a greater sentence, “outweighed any beneﬁt

prematurely reveal potential

to

L.3.)

Both 0f these ﬁndings are supported by the evidence

in light

was

to

come up with ways

Thus, the evidence in the record

only supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion: that the decision to waive the preliminary
hearing was “fairly grounded in strategy.” {2/21/19 Tr., p.1

On
was

appeal Hollingsworth

fails t0

objectively unreasonable for

trial

1,

Ls.4-9.)

show any error. He never comes
counsel t0
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1)

close t0 showing that

it

conclude the preliminary hearing had

minimal value; 2)
trial strategy.

try to avoid exposure to a higher sentence;

These three points will be taken up in
a preliminary hearing

First,

overwhelming evidence showed

and

3) attempt t0 avoid revealing

turn.

would have had minimal,

that

if any,

state’s

Hollingsworth committed an aggravated assault by

repeatedly stabbing Smith. (8/10/16 Tr., p.18, L.6

— p.19, L20;

ﬂ

PSI, pp.1-5.) Hollingsworth

testiﬁed that he “believe[d] he stabbed Smith” and conceded the evidence

Smith.

The

value.

(8/10/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.5-15; p.18, Ls.2-3.)

showed he stabbed

There were three Witnesses t0 the stabbing:

Smith, Darner, and Hollingsworth. (PSI, pp.3-5.) However, only two of those witnesses—Smith

and Damer—have ever claimed
id.)

t0

have any memory of what happened during the stabbing.

Both Smith and Darner consistently told police

that Hollingsworth assaulted Smith.

(E
(PSI,

pp.3-5.)

And

as far as the state can

tell,

Hollingsworth has never identiﬁed any credibility issues

between Smith and Darner regarding the stabbing
consistently testiﬁed, under oath, that he had

Ls.1-2, 10-1

1.)

itself.

How

could he?

no memory 0f the stabbing.

(8/10/16 Tr., p.17,

Thus, a preliminary hearing could not have served t0 impeach either Darner or

Smith, insofar as there was n0 contradictory set 0f facts, about the assault

itself, to

Hollingsworth focuses instead on general credibility issues with Darner.
other facts

Hollingsworth

showed Darner was not

credible, and,

bring out.

He

claims that

somehow, could have supported a theory of

self—defense:

Hales made no independent investigation 0f the facts surrounding the alleged

Hales failed to d0 so, despite Appellant’s speciﬁc instructions t0
investigate Darner’s possession of a stolen stove, Darner’s felony probation
crime.

sword Darner insinuated belonged t0 [Hollingsworth]. A11 of
these issues focused 0n Damer’s credibility, but credibility was not important to
Hales because “Whether 0r not she was a credible Witness, [Hollingsworth’s]

Violation and the

actions

were what they were.” But [Hollingsworth’s] actions were the center of
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Whole defense—[Hollingsworth] was claiming self—defense and Darner was
claiming aggravated assault. Thus, Darner’s credibility was also at the center of
the defense and Hales was unwilling 0r uninterested in investigating this aspect of
the

the case.

(Appellant’s brief, p.48 (internal citations omitted).)

This gets everything backwards.
a matter of

fact.

He

Tr., p.17, Ls.9-1 1.)

First,

Hollingsworth was not “claiming self—defense” as

has consistently testiﬁed that he has no

As

memory of the

stabbing.

(8/10/16

such, he has never made, and could not make, the factual claim that he

stabbed Smith t0 defend himself.

Moreover,

it

was not simply “Darner claiming aggravated

assault”—tw0 people consistently explained that Hollingsworth assaulted Smith, Which
precisely

what the

state’s

evidence showed. (PSI, pp.3-5.) Thus, Darner’s credibility was not

is

at

the “center” of Hollingsworth’s defense, nor could Hollingsworth have proven an afﬁrmative

defense that he had n0

Any
hypothetical

memory of, simply by attacking Damer’s

remaining value of impeaching Darner’s hypothetical
preliminary hearing testimony,

assuming that Darner would be called
as t0

what happened; and

impeach her—and

that she

is

would then

that this convoluted

testimony, with her

trial

completely speculative.

Hollingsworth

to testify at the preliminary hearing; that she

contradict herself at

sum of imaginary parts could

theory that Hollingsworth himself has no

By

credibility.

memory 0f.

contrast, the state’s evidence

trial,

would

thus allowing

Because a potential preliminary hearing had minimal
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him

to

This underwhelms.

was overwhelming.

it.

testify

then shore up a self—defense

And n0 amount

of speculative

impeachment fodder could have proved Hollingsworth’s own afﬁrmative defense

advised Hollingsworth t0 forgo

is

(if

any) value,

trial

for him.

counsel properly

Second, Hollingsworth takes issue With

trial

hearing t0 avoid exposure to a harsher sentence.

because the

counsel’s strategy to waive the preliminary

(Appellant’s brief, pp.50-51.)

state’s ﬁrst offer expired, a harsher potential penalty

even though the hearing was waived.”
expiration of the

“inexcusable.”

offer,”

Hollingsworth thinks “the

a surprise” for

as

fails.

It

was Hollingsworth’s

Hollingsworth’s himself concedes

March

23, 2016.”

this:

“The ﬁve-year

offer expired

(Appellant’s brief, p.51.)

It

now have

it

both ways and complain that

t0 plead not guilty;

brief,

p.29

was

(E

m

p.51.)

and 2) “pressur[ing] him
In

trial

When Appellant

(Dep.

Tr.,

any event, the expiration 0f the

plead[ed]

p.122, Ls.3-6)

counsel was incompetent for

state’s offer

(ﬂ PCR., p.262.)

1)

t0

He

allowing

(Compare Appellant’s

into pleading guilty.”

counsel’s decision t0 waive the preliminary hearing.

PCR., p.262.)

was Hollingsworth’s decision

enter a not-guilty plea (which led to the expiration 0f the offer).

him

counsel,

not-guilly plea, not the waiver 0f the

preliminary hearing, that led to the expiration of the state’s offer.

cannot

trial

(Id.)

This argument

not guilty on

argues that

was “exactly What happened,

(Appellant’s brief, p.51.)

which he purports “came

He

cannot be pinned on

Nor can her

obj ectively

reasonable strategy 0f trying t0 lessen Hollingsworth’s exposure be criticized, simply because

Hollingsworth’s

own

intervening decision to plead not guilty nixed the offer.

Finally, Hollingsworth fails to

show

that

it

was

objectively unreasonable for

t0 advise against a preliminary hearing in order to avoid revealing trial strategy.

Hollingsworth curiously thinks counsel should have done more to reveal

trial

trial

On

counsel

this score,

strategy to the

state:

Hales failed t0 recognize

that, if

her client did not want t0 plead guilty, then she

must prepare a defense by challenging Witness
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credibility

and educating the

prosecutor 0n weaknesses

in its case,

as the client instructed.

hearing was an important tool in preparingfor

The preliminary

trial.

(Appellant’s brief, p.57 (emphasis added).)

This

is

What good would

mystifying.

prosecutor 0n weaknesses in

its

it

have done for defense counsel

case” in order t0 prepare for trial?

the prosecutor might have arguable beneﬁt if the goal

is

(ﬂ

t0 “educat[e] the

Sure, “educating”

id.)

0n

t0 persuade the state t0 settle a case

favorable terms.

But a trial-bound defendant gets n0 upside by “educating the prosecutor on

weaknesses in

case prior to

its

trial.”

(ﬂ

id.)

T0

the contrary,

it is

generally a bad idea t0

reveal a strategy to one’s opponent ahead 0f time, because then the opponent can adapt t0

This

is

precisely

why

trial

counsel was not inclined to put Darner on the stand at a preliminary

hearing. If trial counsel “attacked [Darner] at the preliminary hearing,

I

can use

at trial,”

because “[s]he’s going to be expecting that

come up with ways
Hollingsworth

fails t0

to

it.7

enhance her

show

stories.”

(Dep.

that trial counsel’s decision

at trial

Tr.,

was

99 66

that’s

now not

a strategy

and maybe even had time

p.167, Ls.2-8.)

In any event,

And

objectively unreasonable.

because Hollingsworth has failed to show any deﬁcient performance, he

to

fails to

show

trial

counsel gave ineffective assistance of counsel.

The post-conviction

court’s decision appeared t0 rest

on deﬁcient performance;

it

did not

reach the issue of Whether the advice t0 waive the preliminary hearing was prejudicial.
2/21/19

Tr., p.11, Ls.4-11.)

However,

if this

Court reaches the issue of prejudice,

it

(m

should

conclude that counsel did not give ineffective assistance of counsel because Hollingsworth failed

7

As “Sun Tzu

counsels us, ‘Be extremely subtle, even t0 the point of formless—ness....Thereby

you can be the director of the opponent’s fate.” David Wanetick, HOW SUN TZU WOULD
OUTFLANK PATENT TROLLS, 45 Les Nouvelles 75, 78 (2010). Sun Tzu did not counsel us to “be
extremely noisy, even t0 the point 0f telegraphing your trial strategy. Thereby you can educate
the prosecutor on weaknesses in his case.”
40

t0

show any

prejudice.

In particular, Hollingsworth has

made no showing

that the state

would

have made sentencing concessions absent a waiver, and, other than his contradictory statements
in post-conviction declarations,

error,

he has not shown a “reasonable probability

that,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

U.S. at 59; State

V.

Wood, 132 Idaho

Where appellant made “no showing”
the state,”

88, 97,

as t0

that the result

Lockhart, 474

trial.”

967 P.2d 702, 711 (1998) (ﬁnding no prejudice

what concessions “might have [been] obtained from

Where appellant himself “wanted

was “no showing

but for counsel’s

t0

waive the preliminary hearing,” and Where there

0f the proceeding would have been different

if

a preliminary

hearing had been held”); LaBarge V. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59, 62 (Ct. App. 1989).

Trial

counsel’s

advice

to

waive the preliminary hearing was

reasonable, and Hollingsworth fails t0 meet his burden to

even assuming deﬁcient performance, Hollingsworth
t0

show any “reasonable

guilty

fails

t0

otherwise.

show

trial.”

And

any event,

in

by granting

dismissal motion and dismissing the remaining claim in the petition.

fails

would not have pleaded

Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.

the post-conviction court erred
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objectively

show any prejudice, because he

probability that, but for counsel’s error, he

and would have insisted on going to

accordingly

fails t0

show

entirely

Hollingsworth

the state’s

summary

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

additionally requests this Court

state’s

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

afﬁrm the

court’s order

and judgment

motions for summary dismissal of the post-conviction

The

state

partially granting the

petition.
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